was punishable in the usual courts. Two practical difficulties had always
been found in prosecutions, and they were much increased as soon as a more
vigorous execution was entered upon. It was hard to secure evidence, for
smuggled goods, once landed, rapidly disappeared; and the lower colonial
judges were both to deal severely with their brethren, engaged in a
business which public sentiment did not condemn. In 1761 an attempt was
made in Massachusetts to avoid both these difficulties through the use of
the familiar Writs of Assistance. These were legal processes by which
authority was given to custom-house officers to make search for smuggled
goods; since they were general in their terms and authorized the search of
any premises by day, they might have been made the means of vexatious
visits and interference. In February, 1761, an application for such a writ
was brought before the Superior Court of Massachusetts, which was not
subject to popular influence. James Otis, advocate-general of the colony,
resigned his office rather than plead the cause of the government, and
became the leading counsel in opposition. The arguments in favor of the
writ were that without some such process the laws could not be executed,
and that similar writs were authorized by English statutes. Otis in his
plea insisted that no English statute applied to the colonies unless they
were specially mentioned, and that hence English precedents had no
application. But he went far beyond the legal principles involved. He
declared in plain terms that the Navigation Acts were "a taxation law made
by a foreign legislature without our consent." He asserted that the Acts
of Trade were "irreconcilable with the colonial charters, and hence were
void." He declared that there were "rights derived only from nature and
the Author of nature;" that they were "inherent, inalienable, and
indefeasible by any laws, pacts, contracts, governments, or stipulations
which man could devise." The court, after inquiring into the practice in
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